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AN INTERIM FILLING THE GAP IN
MULTILATERAL, REGIONAL, AND
DOMESTIC HARD LAW DEFICIENCIES.
RESPECTING FINANCIAL SERVICES
INTEGRATION WITHIN THE AMERICAS
Professor Joseph J. Norton*
I. INTRODUCTIONTHE January 2005 deadline for the implementation of the Free
Trade Agreement of the Americas (F[AA) among thirty-four na-
tions (excluding Cuba) of the Western Hemisphere has passed vir-
tually unnoticed by the world press.' The Heads of State Declaration of
the Fourth Summit of the Americas, held in November 2005 at Mar de
Plata Argentina, did recommit to the FTAA process in passing, but with-
out any specificity. 2 Numerous reasons can be given for the current stall-
ing of the FTAA process: the Brazilian position not to cut a final deal
until the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Round negotiations
have been concluded to the satisfaction of the Developing World, the
shift to the left of certain Latin American governments in recent years
giving rise to a new scepticism toward the virtues of free trade and the
Washington Consensus, the hemispheric divisions caused by the Iraq In-
vasion and resultant U.S. neglect of its Latin American foreign policy and
trade agenda, and the impending expiration of the U.S. presidential fast-
*SJD, DPhil., LL.D, James L. Walsh Distinguished Faculty Fellow and Professor of
Financial Institutions Law, SMU Dedman School of Law, Dallas, Texas; and Sir
John Lubbock Professor of Banking Law, University of London ( 1993-2005). Ex-
ecutive Director, SMU Law Institute of the Americas. The author wishes to ex-
press his most sincere appreciation to his good friend and colleague Dr Mauricio
Baquero-Herrera of Columbia for his significant input: the two will be working on
an extended version of this theme for the November 2006 issue of the Eur. Bus. L.
Rev. This article speaks as of November 2005; since then, significant political
events have been occurring within Latin America, the impact remains uncertain.
Throughout 2006, LBRA will report on such recent developments.
1. See generally FrAA, http://www.ftaa-alca.org (last visited Apr. 4, 2006). The latest
draft (3rd) of the proposed treaty, dated November 21, 2003, is contained on this
site.
2. See Fourth Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Mar Del Plata, Creating Jobs
to Fight Poverty and Strengthen Democratic Governance (Nov. 5, 2005), available
at http://www.summit-america.org/Eng-2004/previous-summits.htm. This site also
contains declarations from the prior three summits (Miami 1994, Santiago 1998,
and Quebec 2001), along with those from the 1996 Bolivia and 2004 Monterrey
Special Summits.
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track authority authorized by the U.S. Congress. 3
From the perspective of financial services integration in the Americas,
it was hoped by many that the FTAA, through its proposed comprehen-
sive provisions on services generally and on financial services particularly,
would have set the stage for the substantial liberalization of the hemi-
spheric legal environment for the cross-border provisions of financial ser-
vices and for a significant increase in cross-border financial services
investments. 4 All this obviously is not going to occur according to the
original timetable set out in the Declaration of Principles, emanating
from the First Summit of the Americas held in Miami in December 1994.5
But, the point being presented in this chapter is that there are various
layers of economic integration going on within the Americas, both de jure
and de facto; and that, notwithstanding the current uncertainties of both
the WTO and F-TAA processes respecting financial services, the de facto
dimensions, rooted largely in soft law underpinnings, will continue to
bring about a broadening and deepening of financial services integration
within and throughout the Western Hemisphere.
In general, there are three forms of economic integration in place in
the Western Hemisphere at some level. The first is a de jure multilateral
approach under the WTO umbrella. Nearly all countries of the Western
Hemisphere are currently WTO and General Agreement on Trade in Ser-
vices (GATS) members. Therefore, the framework for the liberalization
of trade in financial and banking services applies to them, yet the individ-
ual country policy positions may vary considerably. As alluded to above,
the advancement of WTO-GATS negotiations on financial services has
been bogged down pending a satisfactory resolution of the Doha Round
negotiations. 6
A second economic integration mode is also a de jure approach, but it
comprises regional, sub-regional, and bilateral agreements such as the
proposed FTAA (currently under standstill negotiations), or South-South
regional and sub-regional schemes such as the Central American Com-
mon Market (CACM), 7 the Caribbean Community and Common Market
3. See Jeffrey J. Schott, Does the FTAA Have a Future?, INST. FOR INT'L ECON., Nov.
2005, available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/schottll05.pdf; see also
Sherry M. Stephenson, The State of the FTAA Negotiations at the Turn of the Mil-
lennium, SICE, (Mar. 25, 2000) available at http://www.sice.oas.org/tunit/STAFF-
ARTICLE/steph00_negmil-e.doc (discusses the complexity of the FTAA negotia-
tions at the turn of the millennium).
4. See, e.g., Joseph J. Norton, Doing Business Under the FTAA: Reflections of a U.S.
Business Lawyer, 6 LAW & Bus. REV. OF THE AM. 421 (2000).
5. See First Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles (Dec. 9-11, 1994),
available at http://www.summit-americas.org/miamidec.htm.
6. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005, WT/
MIN(05)/DEC (2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/theWTOe/minist_
e/min05_e/final_text_e.htm.
7. General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration, Dec. 13, 1960, 455
U.N.T.S. 3. According to its article 1, the contracting states agreed to establish
among themselves a common market and also to create a customs union in respect
of their territories. The treaty entered into force on June 4, 1961 (Guatemala, El
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(CARICOM), 8 the Andean Community,9 the Common Market of the
South (MERCOSUR), a° the South American Community of Nations
(launched this past year),' and the Latin American Integration Associa-
tion (LAIA).12 This type also embraces North-South regional agree-
ments such as the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). 13
Equally, it takes into consideration a U.S.-Central America agreement
(CAFTA, which narrowly passed the U.S. Congress in late 2005),14 bilat-
eral preferential trade agreements (PTAs) such as the U.S.-Chile PTA, 15
and the U.S.-some Andean Countries PTA (currently under negotia-
Salvador, and Nicaragua); on April 27, 1962 (Honduras), and on September 23,
1963 (Costa Rica).
8. Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, July 4, 1973, 946 U.N.T.S. 17, 12
I.L.M. 1033. CARICOM was signed on July 4, 1973 and entered into force on
August 3, 1973. The protocol amending the treaty signed at Chaguaramas in 2001
established the Caribbean Community, including the CARICOM single market
and economy.
9. Andean Subregional Integration Agreement (Cartagena Agreement), May 26,
1969, 8 I.L.M. 910. The Cartagena Agreement was signed in 1969 setting up the
Andean Pact or Pacto Andino. Its original members were Bolivia, Colombia, Ec-
uador, Peru, Chile (withdrawn in 1976), and Venezuela (joined in 1973). The Pro-
tocol of Trujillo (1996) created the Andean Community and the Andean
Integration System.
10. Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) Agreement, Mar. 26, 1991, 301 I.L.M.
1041. Argentina and Brazil agreed on setting up an Integration and Economic Co-
Operation Program in 1986 under LAIA's framework, which was enhanced by
establishing the goal of a common market in 1988. It led to the creation of
MERCOSUR, when Paraguay and Uruguay joined in 1991.
11. South American Community of Nations, Dec. 8, 2004, available at http://www.
comunidadandina.org/ingles/sudamerican.htm. On December 8, 2004, Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, member countries of MERCOSUR, Colombia, Ecua-
dor, Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, member countries of the Andean Community,
Chile, Guyana, Suriname, and Panama, in the Third South American Summit held
in Cuzco Peru, launched the South American Community of Nations as a political
endeavour. This community will gradually be established through the convergence
created by the Economic Complementation Agreement No. 59, signed by Argen-
tina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, member countries of the MERCOSUR, Colom-
bia, Ecuador, Venezuela, member countries of the Andean Community, (Bolivia
and Peru had already adhered to MERCOSUR) and the commitments of Chile,
Guyana, Suriname, and Panama.
12. Treaty of Montevideo Establishing the Latin American Integration Association,
Aug. 12, 1980, 20 I.L.M. 672. The Montevideo Treaty 1980 established LAIA. It is
actually made up of twelve countries as follows: Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uru-
guay, Cuba, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico.
13. There are bilateral or multilateral treaties signed in the regions that follow the
model of NAFTA, signed by Canada, Mexico, and the United Status, that took
effect on January 1, 1994. The G-3 Accord and the bilateral PTAs signed between
the United States and Chile and the United States and Central American countries
are examples of these NAFTA-like agreements. The proposed FTAA is also influ-
enced by NAFF but goes beyond NAFTA in certain respects.
14. Stephen Norton, USTR Spokesman, Statement Regarding CAFTA-DR Imple-
mentation, (Dec. 30, 2005) (signed CAFTA-DR on Aug. 5, 2004 but has not been
entered into force at the time of writing), available at http://www.ustr.gov.
15. United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, State Dep.
No. 04-35, 2003 WL 23856180, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade
Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/FinalTexts/SectionIndex.html (signed on June
6, 2003 and entered into force January 1, 2004).
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tions),' 6 and numerous other bilateral agreements signed under LAIA's
framework. 17 This approach also takes into consideration three lateral
PTAs such as the G-3 Accord. 18 But all these schemes differ in their
methodologies and the scope of their commitments. Further, while these
varying treaty approaches most likely will continue within parts of the
hemisphere to varying degrees, not all of them comprehensively embrace
banking and financial services and not all of them have been imple-
mented consistently. More significantly, there is no coordination among
this spaghetti bowl of Western Hemispheric trade treaties. 19
A third integration form promotes economic and financial integration
through the unilateral openness of the capital account, by liberalization of
rules of entry to foreign banks, and by adoption of soft law international
standards in the banking and financial services area. As a consequence of
the economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s, Central and South American
countries carried out individual domestic structural reforms to that end.
They often were implemented under the guidance and monitoring of mul-
tilateral international institutions (e.g., the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), World Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)),
whose mandates were evolving towards these kinds of roles within the
international financial arena. The adoption, implementation, and compli-
ance of certain economic policies prescribed as the solution to the under-
lying structural failures of the developing countries of the region was
under way. In turn, this environment has promoted a de facto financial
integration through the allowed activities of banks, mainly from the
United States but also Spanish banks, acting internationally and multi-
nationally in the region.
This chapter addresses this third form of economic integration as the
prevailing form that is presently maintaining some positive level of mo-
mentum as to economic and financial services during the period of politi-
cal divisiveness that currently appears to be impeding the furtherance of
both multilateral (WTO) and Western Hemispheric free-trade initiatives
(FTAA). Section II of this chapter considers two external catalysts to this
16. For an analysis of the process towards this PTA in the Andean sub-region, see
Mauricio Baquero-Herrera, The Andean Community: Finding Her Feet Within
Changing and Challenging Multidimensional Conditions, 10 LAW. & Bus. REV.
AM. 577 (2004).
17. For an analysis of the consequences of the regional or partial scope agreements
under LAIA's framework, see Mauricio Baquero-Herrera, A Decade of Open Re-
gionalism in Latin America: The Need for Effective and Efficient Articulation, Co-
ordination, Cooperation and Convergence, in MULTILATERALISM V
UNILATERALISM: POLICY CHOICES IN A GLOBAL SOCIETY 257 (J.B Attanasio &
J.J. Norton eds., 2004).
18. Treaty on Free Trade Between the Republic of Columbia, the Republic of Vene-
zuela, and the United Mexican States, June 13, 1994, available at http://www.sice.
oas.org/TRADE/G03/g3cl4sl.asp. The group of three is the member states of a
Treaty on Free Trade between the Republic of Colombia, the Republic of Vene-
zuela, and the United Mexican States. It was signed in September 1990 and en-
tered into force in January 1, 1995.
19. This phrase was dubbed over a decade ago by Bhagwati and has since been trans-
lated into a graphically complex, but highly depictive chart by the IADB.
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third trade mode: the internationalization of U.S. and Canadian banks
and the pervasiveness of evolving international banking and financial
standards. Section III then analyzes this de facto integration process
within the various Latin American and Caribbean nations. In the con-
cluding section IV, an attempt is made to draw some relevant concluding
observations.
II. TWO EXTERNAL CATALYSTS FOR THE DE FACTO LATIN
AMERICAN FINANCIAL SERVICES INTEGRATION: THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE U.S. AND CANADIAN
BANKING INDUSTRIES AND THE PERVASIVENESS OF
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
The de facto banking and financial services integration occurring in
Latin America results, in part, from several major external catalysts: the
internationalization of U.S. and Canadian banking institutions, the global
pervasiveness of international standards in the financial services area, and
the aggressive Latin American business strategy of the major Spanish
banks. This section addresses only the first two external factors.
A. THE U.S. AND CANADIAN BANKING INDUSTRIES
Financial integration among the two developed countries in the FTAA
area, the United States and Canada, has been primarily carried out
through the international and multi-national activities of domestic and,
nowadays, truly global banking institutions based in these countries. This
has not only led to an internationalization of financial services within
these countries themselves but has provided a launching pad for the
cross-border financial services penetration of many Latin American
countries.
The Canadian Bankers Association reports that the Canadian banking
industry now encompasses nineteen domestic banks, twenty-nine foreign
bank subsidiaries, and twenty-one foreign bank branches.20 But none of
these international banks acting through a subsidiary or a branch in Ca-
nada comes from a Latin American or Caribbean country. According to
Christian Calm&s of the Bank of Canada, corporate bonds and equity
have been the means that a great proportion of financing has been car-
ried out in Canada.21 Canadian firms issue a substantial share of their
bonds in the U.S. bond market, and an increasing share of their stocks in
the U.S. stock market.22
Based on information released by the U.S. Federal Reserve Board as of
December 31, 2004, six Canadian banks are present in the U.S. financial
20. See Canadian Bankers Association, Banks in Canada, http://www.cba.ca/en/sec-
tion.asp?fl=2&sl=204&tl=&docid= (last visited Dec. 19, 2005).
21. Christian Calmis, Regulatory Changes and 'Financial Structure: The Case of Ca-
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markets by way of fifty-eight offices, mainly through thirty-five U.S. com-
mercial banks majority owned by Canadian banks, twelve branches, six
representative offices, and five agencies.23 The country total of U.S. do-
mestic assets is about $168,291,000.24 In contrast, the Latin American
and Caribbean participation in the U.S. market shows that only fourteen
out of the thirty-five independent countries that comprise the FTAA area
have a presence in the U.S. banking market, mainly by means of branches
of twenty-seven different banks.25 Those banks have only thirty-seven
offices: nineteen are branches, eight are representative offices, eight are
agencies, one is a U.S. commercial bank majority owned by an Ecuado-
rian bank, and one is a U.S. office of banking edge or agreement corpora-
tion majority owned by a Colombian Bank. 26 Their total assets in the
U.S. amount to $9,507,000 (about seventeen times less than the Canadian
banks).27 At the same time, as a result of the severe Latin American
banking crises and the policies implemented during the 1990s, foreign
banks, mainly from Spain and the United States, control majority shares
in nearly all of the Latin American financial systems, with the important
exceptions of Brazil and Colombia. 28
In 2001, a report by Salomon Smith Barney on the foreign financial
institutions in Latin America found that foreign institutions controlled 47
percent of loans and 43 percent of deposits in the seven major economies
of Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico Peru, and
Venezuela). 29 At the time, Mexico scored as the country with the largest
portion of foreign control and Citibank was the largest foreign institution
by economic participation in the total of the region.
The participation of banks acting internationally (without having a
commercial presence in any other jurisdiction through a subsidiary,
branch, or representation office) or acting multi-nationally (maintaining a
commercial presence) in other financial systems has created a web of
complex economic and legal relationships that have increased the risk of
contagion among the participant institutions and economies. Different
episodes of international financial crises spreading from one country to
another brought about the need for establishing and implementing inter-
national standards of banking supervision. At the beginning, these ef-
forts were aimed at determining the responsibilities among regulators,
supervisors, and central banks related to banks of developed financial
23. Federal Reserve Board, Structured Data For U.S. Offices of Foreign Banks By





28. Jennifer S. Crystal et al., Has Foreign Bank Entry Led to Sounder Banks in Latin
America?, 8 CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. & FIN. 1, (2002) (Federal Reserve Bank of
New York), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/currentissues/ci8-1.
pdf.
29. See Foreign Financial Institutions in Latin America: 2001 Update, SALOMON-
SMITHBARNEY (2001), available at http://www.superbancaria.gov.co/English/
Bancosfondospension esenla.pdf.
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systems acting international and multi-nationally. But these standards
have evolved, focusing more on the activities of such banks and the deter-
mination and adequate management of all risks involved in the provision
of banking and financial services as well as on the new complexities cre-
ated by the domestic and global activities of the financial conglomerates.
In addition, due to the activities of global banks acting in developing
countries with higher levels of macroeconomic and financial instability
and the heavy losses some of them have had to bear as a consequence of
having such a presence, a strategy for the formulation, adoption, and im-
plementation of sound principles and practices to strengthen financial
systems was launched in 1997.30 It has been implemented throughout de-
veloping financial systems under the guise of fostering international fi-
nancial stability. In fact, the core goal of preserving international
financial stability has changed the functions of multilateral institutions
such as the IMF and the World Bank and has produced a set of standard-
setters composing the so-called international financial architecture. The
more sophisticated the financial activities have become the more com-
plexity that is required in the international standards. The recent Basel II
Capital Accord is an example of this. This proliferation of international
standards in the financial services area has not only permeated the devel-
oped countries but also most of the Latin American and Caribbean devel-
oping countries.
B. THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FACTOR
This permeation of international standards within the Latin countries
has occurred though domestic financial infrastructure reforms generated
unilaterally through International Financial Institutions (IFI) conditional-
ity and through the influence of the international banks themselves.
The above chart sets out the main standard-setters at the international
level. Step-by-step core areas of banking and financial activities have
been covered by the work of informal international arrangements or in-
ternational financial/economic institutions. The consistent and coherent
work of the Basel Committee and its method of using soft law as a means
for stating its principles and codes of conduct and good practices has
served as a starting model for other institutions and arrangements. But
other standard-setters may not achieve the consistency gained by a group
of experienced central bankers, regulators, and supervisors of a reduced
but powerful group of developed countries that comprise and finally in-
fluence the decisions of the Basel Committee. 31
30. See FINANCIAL STABILITY IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES: A STRATEGY FOR
THE FORMULATION, ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SOUND PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICES TO STRENGTHEN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, REPORT OF THE WORKING
PARTY ON FINANCIAL STABILITY IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES (Apr. 1997),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/gtenO2.pdf.
31. See JOSEPH JUDE NORTON, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY STAN-
DARDS (Graham & Trotman/Martines Nijhoffl995); see also About the Basel Corn-
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Chart: The main standards and standard-setters at the
international level.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Banking Supervision
(BASEL)
International Organisation of Securities Securities
Commissions (IOSCO)
The Committee on Payment and Settlement Payment Systems
Systems
The International Association of Insurance Insurance Supervision
Supervisors (IAIS)





International Accounting Standards Board Accounting Standards
(IASC)
International Auditing and Assurance Standards Auditing
Board
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Principles of Corporate
Development (OECD) Governance
Financial Action Task Force Market Integrity
The organizational structures and cultures present in each one of these
arrangements and institutions acting as standard-setters may determine
their final product. For instance, in some cases the IMF and the World
Bank have had contrasting views as to issues related to economic policies
and their implementation. IOSCO has a different structure and member-
ship (108 ordinary members), as well as IAIS (insurance supervisory au-
thorities of some 180 jurisdictions), as compared to the Basel Committee
(thirteen country members), which may require higher levels of consen-
sus in these broader based arrangements and, therefore, may deliver deci-
sions with a greater degree of generality. 32
The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was convened in April 1999 to
promote international financial stability through information exchange
and international co-operation in financial supervision and surveillance.
mittee, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.orglbcbs/index.
htm.
32. See IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org &'Internacional Association of Insurance Super-
visors, http://www.iais.web.org. See generally IMF, http://www.imf.org & World
Bank, http://www.worldbank.org.
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The Forum brings together on a regular basis national authorities respon-
sible for financial stability in significant international financial centres,
international financial institutions, sector-specific international groupings
of regulators and supervisors, and committees of central bank experts.
The FSF seeks to co-ordinate the efforts of these various bodies in order
to promote international financial stability, improve the functioning of
markets, and reduce systemic risk.33
Representatives mainly from developed countries and international
bodies and institutions with diverse mandates that regulate, supervise, or
oversee the domestic and international activities of conglomerates deal-
ing with contracts of different nature and dissimilar levels of risks require
a significant amount of coordination, cooperation, understanding, and
ability to negotiate. Furthermore, reaching consensus on the minimum
standards does not mean that financial stability will be reached instantly
or ever, especially in developing countries. All these general standards
have to face the mediation of their local implementation and enforce-
ment and the continuing test of financial stress and crisis at domestic and
international levels.
All these considerations led to crucial questions raised during recent
years. Who sets the international financial standards? Who implements
and interprets these rules? Who enforces the rules? Who adjudicates
disputes? All these questions are related to the legal nature of the stan-
dards, to the missing link between those standard-setters and democratic
institutions and representation, to the ability of domestic regulators and
supervisors to understand the purpose of each one of the standard-setters
and the scope of all the standards available, to their capability of imple-
menting them thoroughly, to their capacity of adequate monitoring and
enforcing such regulation, and to the aptitude of the local law-makers and
judiciary to properly understand the context of this global effort.34 Are
they prepared to deliver proper regulation and decisions coherent with
the purpose of financial stability?35
The so-called New International Financial Architecture (NIFA) is a set
of different international bodies whose mandates, jurisdictions, and pow-
ers are unclear. It is composed of: multilateral agencies (IMF, the World
Bank, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), OECD), policy for-
mulation groups (G7/8, G10, G22, but primarily the G7/8), and interna-
tional regulatory and standard setting authorities (BASEL, IAIS,
IOSCO, IASC, IFI, FSF)36 that are composed of senior representatives of
33. See generally Financial Stability Forum, http://www.fsforum.org/home/home.html
(last updated Mar. 30, 2006).
34. See Stijn Claessens, Regulatory Reform and Trade Liberalization in Financial Ser-
vices, Paper Presented at the Joint OECD-World Bank Conference on Regulatory
Reform and Trade Liberalization in Services in Paris (Mar. 4-5, 2002), available at
http://wwwl.fee.uva.nl/fmfPAPERS/Claessens/reform.pdf.
35. Andrew Sheng, The New International Architecture: Is There a Workable Solu-
tion?, in A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE: A VIABLE AP-
PROACH 35 (J.B. Atanasio & J.J. Norton eds., 2001).
36. Id.
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national financial authorities (central banks, supervisory authorities, and
treasury departments), international financial institutions, international
regulatory and supervisory groupings, and committees of central bank ex-
perts. This side of the NIFA has the purpose of imposing minimum inter-
nationally accepted supervisory standards and practices for emerging and
transitioning economies.
Furthermore, NIFA has another side that is indeed marching towards a
new evolving governance structure, reflecting a public-private partner-
ship among governments, banking authorities, international financial in-
stitutions, and international commercial banking institutions, in the
search for grounding a stable but viable financial environment. But this
side is not available to all. A small class of elite global banking institu-
tions, which possess far greater expertise and resources to manage risk
exposures using sophisticated risk measurement and aggregation method-
ologies that greatly exceed the sophistication of other banks and banking
authorities, are separating regulation and supervision towards a more
functional self-regulatory framework. 37
"This 'risk-based supervision' framework essentially redirects responsi-
bility and accountability for the design, development and implementation
of risk management and internal control processes to the elite banks
themselves, subject to purported oversight of and imposition of general
parameters and standards set forth by the authorities. ' 38 This is the case
of the new Basel II Capital Accord finally released last year.
C. THE SOFT LAW FACTOR: A SUBSTITUTE FOR A FORMAL
TREATY FRAMEWORK?
Soft laws have been defined as "statements prepared by individuals in a
nongovernmental capacity, but which purport to lay down international
principles" 39 These statements are legally non-binding instruments, rec-
ommendations, and codes of good practices issued by experts that are not
democratically elected. "The use of the non-legal form is dictated by lack
of formal law-making capacity and the impact of a non-binding text de-
pends upon the political and economic interests of the relevant
players.'"40
The setting up of international standards in the form of soft law has
raised controversial issues. Following Philip Turner of BIS, the first issue
is the number of standards that are a result of a decentralized process
37. Joseph J. Norton, A 'New International Financial Architecture?': Reflections on the
Possible Law-based Dimension, in A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHI-
TECTURE: A VIABLE APPROACH 135, 175-178 (J.B. Attanasio & J.J. Norton eds.,
2001) [hereinafter Norton].
38. Id. at 176.
39. C. M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in Interna-
tional Law, 38 INTL. & COMP. L.Q. 850, 851 (1989).
40. Christine Chinkin, Normative Development in the International Legal System, in
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE IN-
TERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 21, 29 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
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with no mechanism for setting priorities. 4' Because each standard-setter
believes its standards are of prime importance, there is a risk that the
most important or urgent standards could be ignored.42 The second issue
is the membership of standard-setting bodies. 43 Even though the Basel
Committee has proven that one small group may be effective enough, the
resulting exclusion of others in the membership is indeed a polemic mat-
ter.44 It has lead to the establishment of consultative mechanisms, bring-
ing together countries left out and the private sector.45 The third issue is
whether standards should be differentiated or standardized. 46 Countries
with different levels of development may need different standards. But
the standards should be general so they can be applicable to all. At the
same time, the standard-setters issue detailed guidelines that can be ap-
plied in different ways to adapt to individual circumstances. 47
A further question is related to the implementation of these set of in-
struments, recommendations, and codes. To those participants in their
establishment, there is no other mechanism to enforce their implementa-
tion but a kind of gentlemen agreement among their setters. To the rest,
especially developing countries, the IMF conditionality has proven to be
an effective method.
Following Dr. Y. V. Reddy's, Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of
India, classification, there are some standards that are purely technical
(i.e., accounting, auditing, and supervision). 48 In this sense, the lack of
democratic grounds may not be a fundamental issue as no one considers
leaving decisions of prudential regulation or specific accounting or audit-
ing matters in the hands of politicized members of a country's
legislature.4 9
There are other standards related to monetary and financial policies,
fiscal transparency, and securities regulation that have certain policy im-
plications. In this sense, as Reddy points out, they would form an integral
part of the economic reform process in many developing countries. 50 The
implementation of such policies may "depend on timing, sequencing and
complementarity in related areas and availability of institutional, techno-
41. Philip Turner, Bank for International Settlements, Development and the Interna-
tional Financial Architecture, Presented at the Overseas Development Institute
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logical and legal infrastructure."' 51 When the reforms do not take into
account these factors, they may not deliver the expected results leading to
an extremely severe social cost. These reforms, shaped through standards
implemented by way of IMF conditionality, have proven to be controver-
sial if they do not deliver their economic promises, resulting in interna-
tional standard-setters being involved in problems of accountability,
social unrest, and political unrest.
Finally, Reddy suggests that standards "in the areas of corporate gov-
ernance, insurance and to a certain extent, insolvency and bankruptcy
practices take a socio-cultural dimension and pose challenges of design,
adoption and implementation. '52
The increasing establishment of PTAs that contain chapters or clauses
related to the provision of banking and financial services is intersecting
NIFA's world. Even though PTAs do not include clauses related to pru-
dential regulation, as in the cases of NAFTA-like agreements, some pro-
visions require for the countries involved to fulfil certain minimum
standards or conditions that become hard law as a result of being con-
tained in the treaty.
For instance, articles 1410 of NAFTA and 12.10 of the U.S.-Chile PTA
regulate the exceptions to the rules concerning trade in financial services.
Both articles, with some differences, allow the parties to adopt or main-
tain reasonable measures for prudential reasons, such as: (a) the protec-
tion of investors, depositors, financial market participants, policyholders,
policy claimants, or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a finan-
cial institution or cross-border financial service provider; (b) the mainte-
nance of the safety, soundness, integrity, or financial responsibility of
financial institutions or cross-border financial service providers; and (c)
ensuring the integrity and stability of a party's financial system. Equally,
the provisions allow the parties to prevent or limit transfers by a financial
institution or cross-border financial services provider to, or for the benefit
of, an affiliate of or person related to such institution or provider,
through the equitable, non-discriminatory, and good faith application of
measures relating to maintenance of the safety, soundness, integrity, or
financial responsibility of financial institutions or cross-border financial
service providers.
The U.S.-Chile PTA defines the term prudential reasons as the mainte-
nance of the safety, soundness, integrity, or financial responsibility of in-
dividual financial institutions or cross-border financial service suppliers.
It also establishes that such measures must not be used as a means of
avoiding the party's commitments or obligations under the-general provi-
sions of the treaty.53
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note 15, art. 12.09, art. 12.10
& related Annexes.
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Certainly, the existence of international standards of banking supervi-
sion is an important step to clarify the broad meaning of the concept pru-
dential reasons. But in cases of disputes between members, the
mechanism to resolve such controversy involves not the standard-setter
and its group of senior central bankers, nor the regulators and supervisors
that implement them domestically, but a group of arbitrators from differ-
ent countries and cultures. As the group of standard-setters usually
comes from public entities, doubts concerning their capability to become
international arbitrators still remain.
III. THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES
AND THE DE FACTO INTEGRATION PROCESS
This Section considers the de facto financial integration consequences
of the unilateral openness of Latin American economies as well as the
financial reforms carried out during the 1990s. Structural reforms were
implemented with the aim of gaining macroeconomic stability in the re-
gion. The opening of the capital account by the Latin American countries
was another policy adopted with the purpose of attracting foreign direct
investment. At the same time, financial regulation and supervision have
been strengthened through the local implementation of international
standards of banking supervision. Such decisions have fostered a signifi-
cant commercial presence of foreign banking institutions of non-member
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.
A. FINANCIAL SECTOR INFRASTRUCTURAL REFORMS: DOMESTIC
MACRO-ECONOMIC INSTABILITY, IFI REFORMS, AND
DOMESTIC INITIATIVES
In Latin America and the Caribbean region, the provision of banking
and financial services at a domestic level has been affected by turbulent
macroeconomic environments involving volatile terms of trade and real
exchange rates. The whole region has had a long history of
macroeconomic instability that has been the result, in part, of unstable
fiscal and monetary policies and the adoption of unsustainable exchange
rate regimes.54 In most Latin American countries, these circumstances
have been a critical factor restraining financial system development. 55
As a consequence of the external debt crisis of the 1980s and the strate-
gies adopted to bring economic stability to the region, there was political
will to implement structural reforms through out Latin America. Interna-
tional financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, began
54. See SHAHID JAVED BURKI & GUILLEMO E. PERRY, THE LONG MARCH: A RE-
FORM AGENDA FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN IN THE NEXT DECADE
(The World Bank 1997).
55. Anoop Singh et al., Stabilization and Reform in Latin America: A Macroeconomic
Perspective on the Experience Since the Early 1990s, IMF OCCASIONAL PAPER 238,
ch. VII (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/op/238/index.
htm [hereinafter IMF 2005].
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to play a supervisory role by conditioning their loans upon economic pol-
icy reform of the debtors.
The IMF reform programs put into practice in Latin America focused
on policies aimed at gaining macroeconomic stability in the region.
Among others, the following should be underlined: reduction in the
budget deficit to limit inflation, local interest rates, and the need for for-
eign borrowing; limits on domestic credit expansion to control inflation;
exchange rate devaluations to discourage imports and encourage exports;
and limits on borrowing consistent with the debtor's capacity to pay.5 6
Apart from reducing the size and role of local governments, IMF struc-
tural adjustments were also focused on curtailing protectionism as op-
posed to the Washington Consensus,57 by which "economic growth is
promoted through unilateral tariff cuts and reductions in import restric-
tions."' 58 These neo-liberal policies, introduced at the domestic level led
to the opening of the Latin American markets, which at some point
shared the same market-oriented economic policies.
During the 1990s, countries in the region recorded significant advances
in the area of macroeconomic stability by implementing structural re-
forms focused on achieving better allocation of resources.59 Certainly,
the disastrous macroeconomic phenomenon of hyperinflation evidenced
in the 1980s as well as the practice of using monetary expansion to fi-
nance public expenditure and fiscal deficit have almost disappeared or
have been heavily reduced in the region. In addition, budget balances,
fiscal savings, and the quantum and diversification of exports have im-
proved considerably. Privatizations have also been massively conducted
throughout Latin America.60
In the financial sector, emphasis was made on improving legal
frameworks, capital account opening, and on the implementation of the
international standards of banking supervision developed during the last
decade by the BASEL. Financial reforms in the 1990s generated signifi-
cant transformations and developments in the banking sector in the re-
gion.61 Considerable reduction in public owned banks, decline in the
numbers and increasing consolidation of the banking operators, 62 by
56. Other structural adjustments included: 1) higher income and sales taxes, 2) higher
charges for state-produced goods and services such as electricity and water, 3)
privatization of state-owned companies, and 4) deregulation of the labour market.
See Ross P. BUCKLEY, EMERGING MARKETS DEBT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SECON-
DARY MARKET 32 (Kluwer Law 1999).
57. John Williamson, What Should the World Bank Think About the Washington Con-
sensus?, 15 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 251 (2000).
58. See BUCKLEY, supra note 56, at 32.
59. See IMF 2005, supra note 55.
60. See RICARDO FRENCH-DAVIS, REFORMING THE REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA:
MACROECONOMICS, TRADE, FINANCE (2000).
61. See REFORM OF LATIN AMERICAN BANKING SYSTEMS,, (Ernesto Aguirre & Jo-
seph Norton eds., 2000); see also Ernesto Livacic & Sebastian Siez, La Agenda de
la Supervisi6n Bancaria en America Latina, 74 REVISTA DE LA CEPAL 125 (2001).
62. See Ignacio S. Palacios, Presidente, La Consolidaci6n de la Banca Latinoameri-
cana, Presentation at FELABAN: Federaci6n Latinoamericana de Bancos (2003),
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means of mergers and acquisitions, as well as, an important share in the
participation of the foreign banks in the domestic banking sectors were
significant consequences of such reforms. Additionally, the structure and
market mechanisms were improved by enhancing the scope of authorized
operations to be performed domestically by the banks, including financial
operations such as factoring and leasing. Equally, banks were allowed to
participate in securities related operations and insurance commercializa-
tion. Such transformations were conducted through deregulation or the
reduction of state intervention in the markets by basically procuring the
elimination of interest rates controls, mandatory reserves, limits to inter-
national transactions, and rules on providing credits to specific sectors. 63
In this .sense, these processes of financial liberalization, privatization,
and implementation of market-based reforms were some of the causes of
the surge of financial sector foreign direct investment not only to Latin
America but to all emerging economies in the 1990s. 64 But the mid and
late 1990s witnessed the Tequila crisis of 1994 ("the first time that Latin
America experienced an important impact generated by financial global-
ization"), 65 the trans-nationalization of finance, the tele-information
revolution, the Asian (1997) and Russian (1998) crises, and the Brazil and
Argentinean crises (starting in 1999). 66
The evidence found by the IADB in 1997 suggested that countries in
the region that implemented deeper structural reforms experienced
greater reductions in macroeconomic volatility.67 But such "volatility
during the 1990s was very high by international standards and their own
historical standards in several major countries, including Argentina, Mex-
ico, and Peru, all major reformers. ' 68 The World Bank, concerning Latin
America and the Caribbean region, concludes that macroeconomic insta-
bility is the third most-reported constraint to private investment, pre-
ceded by policy uncertainty and corruption. 69
In February 2005, the managing director of the IMF, pointing to the
challenges and opportunities of Latin America in the macroeconomic
front, considered that policymakers in the region still need to keep their
available at http://www.asobanca.com.ve/data/archivos/200201/Consolidaci%F3n
BancaLatinoamericanaFINAL.ppt.
63. See Livacic & Sdez, supra note 61, at 126-130.
64. COMMITTEE ON THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR OF EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES, (Bank for Inter-
national Settlements 2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cgts22.pdf.
65. Juan F. Rojas Penso, General Secretary of the Latin American Integration Associ-
ation, Address Delivered at the Panel Latin American and Caribbean Options in
Light of the International Financial Crisis: The Effects of the Crisis on Integration,
(Oct. 2, 1999).
66. Id.
67. Michael Gavin, A Decade of Reform in Latin America: Has It Delivered Lower
Volatility? 1 & 15 (IADB, Working Paper Green Series No. 349, 2003), available at
http://www.iadbiorg/res/publications/pubfiles/pobWP-349.pdf.
68. Id.
69. See generally WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005: A BETTER IN-
VESTMENT CLIMATE FOR EVERYONE (Oxford University Press 2004).
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eyes on the following: 1) maintaining appropriate public debt levels, as a
reduction in debt levels would ease existing vulnerabilities and increase
the scope for flexible fiscal responses to macroeconomic shocks; 2) bal-
ancing spending and capital investment, cutting on spending in nonessen-
tial areas, and increasing investments in infrastructure, health, and
education; and 3) keeping inflation in check. 70 The prime objective of
monetary policy should be to lock in and strengthen the substantial pro-
gress made in the last ten years in the region.71
Overall, as a result of the implementation of structural reforms and
economic stabilization policies, Latin America is a less volatile region.72
Such achievement would have not been reached without political will.
Certainly, as the President of the IADB evidenced in 2002, there is "gen-
uine political will in the region to deepen interdependence and reduce
volatility. ' 73 Such certainty led him to propose and conduct the bank
towards introducing programs of macroeconomic cooperation in the
region.7 4
B. THE LATIN AMERICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS IN CONTEXT
Although the Latin American Financial Systems are not homogeneous,
there are certain common features present in the overall activities of the
banks in the region. 75 Traditional commercial banking operations have
been their main focus, whereas the securities market is still poorly devel-
oped, mostly small and illiquid. The private sector use of bond and equity
markets to raise finance remains limited in relation to its recourse to
banks. Financing from securities markets is usually available to only a
limited range of top quality corporate borrowers. 76
The banks' lending activities are also not that significant. When refer-
ring to the size of the region's credit markets, the IADB concludes that it
is shockingly small when compared with developed countries.77 The state
has traditionally played a major role in the financial sector by specializing
public-sector financing institutions in long-term funding. Despite the im-
70. Rodrigo De Rato, Managing Director of IMF, Remarks at Canning House: Latin
America in the Global Economy-Challenges and Opportunities (Feb. 4, 2005),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2O5/020405.htm.
71. Id.
72. See Gavin, supra note 67. See also Ben S. Bernanke, Member of the Board of
Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve System, Inflation in Latin America - A
New Era?, Speech at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Eco-
nomic Summit, Stanford, California (Feb. 11, 2005), available at http://www.bis.org/
review/r050216g.pdf.
73. Enrique V. Iglesias, Former IDB President, Speech in Washington, D.C.: Is
Macroeconomic Coordination Desirable and Possible in Latin America? (Sep. 26,
2002).
74. Id.
75. See Graciela Moguillansky et al., Foreign Banks in Latin America: A Paradoxical
Result, CEPAL REVIEW No. 82 (2004).
76. See IMF 2005, supra note 55.
77. UNLOCKING CREDIT: THE QUEST FOR DEEP AND STABLE BANK LENDING (IADB
2005), available at http://www.iadb.org/res/ipes/2005/index.cfm (last visited July 18,
2005) [hereinafter UNLOCKING].
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portant presence of foreign banks, the largest institutions remain in gov-
ernment hands, as was the case in Brazil and Argentina in 2000.78
The region's banking systems are shallow and the scope of their activi-
ties is very narrow. It can be explained, on the one hand, by the fact that
Latin American banks operate within an environment of structural fac-
tors that increase a bank's aversion to lending.79 The repeated financial
crises during the 1990s led to a lack of adequate information on potential
borrowers: the long time bank customers disappeared and the new ones
did not have long credit histories, did not present sound business plans, or
did not have good collateral. In addition, inadequate auditing and ac-
counting standards and practices affect banks' ability to monitor both fi-
nancial and non-financial companies.
On the other hand, there is an inefficient judiciary that undermines the
legal certainties needed to foster financial intermediation. The Latin
American domestic legal frameworks do not consistently support en-
forceability of creditor's rights, and the insolvency laws in the region do
not protect financial creditors efficiently. All Latin American countries,
and some in the Caribbean, are civil law based. In this sense, La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, in different papers, have prof-
fered that common law countries generally display the strongest protec-
tion to creditors, whereas French civil law countries have the weakest
legal protections of investors.80 German and Scandinavian civil law coun-
tries are located in the middle. As L6pez-de-Silanes suggests, there is a
growing consensus that reforming the legal infrastructure supporting bus-
iness should be an important component of reforms in many developing
countries.81 But there are still many forces reluctant to changes, and
there is little agreement about what constitutes feasible legal reforms.
As for Latin American banks' profitability, returns on assets and equity
remain below those in industrial countries, despite having high interest
margins on private lending. The weak profitability performance of Latin
American banks "reflects a continued reliance on interest earnings, both
from lending and from large holdings of government bonds as the main
source of revenue. '82 These banks have not found other sources of in-
come, such as commissions from asset management and fees from securi-
ties trading, as in most of Latin America these lines of business remain
limited.
Cost inefficiencies are another source of reduced profitability. Banks'
operating costs remain high, amounting to more than 90 percent of oper-
78. See IMF 2005, supra note 55.
79. Id.
80. See La Porta et al., Law and Finance (Harv. Inst. Econ. Res., Working Papers 1768,
1996), available at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/papers/law
andfinance.pdf.
81. Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, NAFTA and Mexico's Reforms on Investor Protection,
YALE U. AND NBER, (June, 2002), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/geograph/
north/silanes.pdf.
82. See IMF 2005, supra note 55, at 68.
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ating income, which is about a third higher than banks in advanced coun-
tries. Part of the explanation for higher costs is that banking is labor
intensive and labor productivity has been low. The cost of provisioning,
nonperforming loans is another burden on banks' costs. 83
According to the IADB 84, in the 1990s the average level of credit to the
private sector in the region was only 28 percent of Gross Domestic Prod-
uct.85 This was significantly lower than in other developing regions, such
as East Asia and the Pacific (72 percent) and the Middle East and North
Africa (43 percent). An explanation of it may be cherry-picking behav-
ior, as many banks can achieve higher profits through commission income
and investment in government securities. The consequence of such be-
havior is the limited access to bank credit; there is low access to credit by
micro-enterprises, small rural producers, and the poor, who cannot save
and nobody is willing to lend money to them.86 In fact, it represents only
a fraction of bank assets in the region.
Another feature of the Latin American banking systems is market con-
centration. Due to the financial crises of the mid and late 1990s, the de-
crease in the number of banks led to an important increase in bank
concentration in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chile, Guatemala, and Colom-
bia. But Latin America as a whole did not experience an increase in bank
concentration as large as that observed in other developing countries.87
In this area, there are some findings that are important to take into ac-
count. For instance, it appears that in developing countries, consolidation
does not improve efficiency. Further, the optimal size of banks operating
in developing countries may be smaller than that of banks operating in
developed countries. 88 Also, Levy-Yeyati and Micco, studying Latin
American bank performance, found that concentration appears to pro-
duce no impact on the level of risk taken by banks. 89 There is also evi-
dence that a more concentrated banking system may improve access to
credit for small firms.90 Moreover, it seems that banking system concen-
tration does not necessarily lead to less competition in countries with eas-
ier entry and fewer restrictions on bank activity. 91 In addition, it appears
that concentrated access to financial markets also contributes to the
83. Id.
84. See UNLOCKING, supra note 77.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at ch. 9.
88. Id.
89. See Eduardo Levy-Yeyati & Alejandro Micco, Concentration and Foreign Penetra-
tion in Latin American Banking Sectors: Impact on Competition and Risk (Univer-
sidad Torcuato Di Tella Bus. Sch., Working Papers 5, 2003), available at http://
www.utdt.edu/departamentos/empresarial/cif/pdfs-wp/wpcif-122003.
90. See UNLOCKING, supra note 77.
91. See Stijn Claessens & Luc Laeven, Competition in the Financial Sector and Growth:
A Cross-Country Perspective, in FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH: EXPLAINING THE LINKS (Charles Goodhart ed., 2003) (forthcoming
Nov. 2003), available at http://wwwl.fee.uva.nl/fm/PAPERS/Claessens/Competi-
tion%20and%20Growth4.pdf.
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highly concentrated pattern of growth that characterizes most of Latin
American and Caribbean countries..
In relation to the state ownership of financial institutions, public banks
still control a large fraction of banking assets in Latin America. La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer found that government ownership of
banks is large and pervasive around the world.92 Such ownership is par-
ticularly significant in countries with low levels of per capita income, un-
derdeveloped financial systems, interventionist and inefficient
governments, and poor protection of property rights. Also, government
ownership of banks is associated with slower subsequent financial devel-
opment. Furthermore, government ownership of banks is associated with
lower subsequent growth of per capita income, and in particular with
lower growth of productivity rather than slower factor accumulation.
According to a recent work by Micco and Panizza,93 cross sectional
evidence shows that public banks in Latin America have lower profitabil-
ity, high levels of overhead costs, and higher levels of nonperforming
loans relative to their private banks. In consequence, one of the main
aims of the privatization process in developing countries of the region has
been to improve the economic efficiency of banking activities. But a dy-
namic analysis of banks' performance before and after the privatization
process conducted by the referred scholars, shows mixed results in terms
of privatizations increasing economic efficiency. They conclude that in
Latin America, in the last nine years, privatized banks do not appear to
have increased systematically their profitability and efficiency. 94 In the
same vain, the IADB has found some new evidence indicating that, at
least in the case of Latin America, public banks may play a useful role in
reducing credit pro-cyclicality. 95
A final feature of the market structure that Latin American banks con-
duct are activities in the dollarization process: Ecuador and El Salvador
embraced full dollarization as a political decision; Bolivia and Peru have
experienced a market-driven process of currency substitution while some
countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Colombia have avoided such
phenomenon. 96
It was expected that the presence of foreign banks in the region would
help to improve some of the structural deficiencies of the Latin American
financial systems briefly described above. The following sub-section ana-
lyzes the behavior of foreign banks inquiring on the consequences of their
presence and their fulfillment of such expectations.
92. Rafael La Porta et al., Government Ownership of Banks, J. FIN (2000), available at
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/papersbanks-paper-jof.pdf.
93. Alejandro Micco & Ugo Panizza, Bank Ownership and Lending Behavior (IADB
Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo Research Department Departamento de In-
vestigacion, Working Paper No. 520, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract-id=629382.
94. Id.
95. See UNLOCKING, supra note 77.
96. But bans on foreign currency deposits or discouraging their use seem to encourage
the shifting of financial assets offshore. See IMF 2005, supra note 55.
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C. THE UNILATERAL OPENNESS AND THE FOREIGN
BANKS' PRESENCE
The unilateral openness of the Latin American banking systems to for-
eign competitors was based on the conception that their local presence
would be essential to improve their efficiency through increased competi-
tion as well as to meet the capital needs of domestic banks. Following
Sukanya Bose, it is assumed that foreign banks are more efficient than
domestic banks in emerging economies due to their ability to introduce
best practices and new technologies into the host countries. 97 In addition,
the domestic operations of foreign banks would raise market discipline
and increase the efficiency of domestic banks, as well as, financial inter-
mediation, and the supply of credit. Furthermore, foreign banks have a
positive effect on the macroeconomic stability of a country in times of
domestic economic shocks. 98
Since the second half of the 1990s, there has been an increasingly
strong presence of foreign banks in the region.99 The bank restructuring
processes of the last decade have led to increased concentration, as more
than two-thirds of bank assets are concentrated in the ten largest institu-
tions, which hold about 70 percent of deposits and provide 75 percent of
credit.100 In 2004, Spanish and U.S. banks accounted for about 80 per-
cent of cumulative investments. 10 1 In 2001, the twelve largest foreign in-
stitutions accounted for 32 percent of the banking business and controlled
around 47 percent of loans and 43 percent of deposits in the seven major
economies of Latin America. 10 2
In general, there is a consensus on the fact that foreign ownership of
foreign banks has strengthened the Latin American financial systems at a
microeconomic level, as foreign banks tend to maintain greater asset li-
quidity and rely less on deposit financing, to show stronger loan growth
than private domestic banks, to provision more aggressively against bad
loans, and to have higher loan recovery rates.10 3 They also display more
efficient overall financial intermediation, maintain higher risk-based capi-
tal ratios, and are more willing to tolerate lower returns in the near term
97. See Sukanya Bose, Banking FDI in Latin America: An Economic Coup, IDEAS
(2005), available at http://www.networkideas.org/focus/mar2005/Banking-FDI.pdf.
98. See Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, Collateral Damage: Effects of the Japanese Bank
Crisis on Real Activity in the United States, 90 AMER. ECON. REV. 30 (2000).
99. See Crystal et al., supra note 28, at 1-2.
100. See IMF 2005, supra note 55. See also Moguillansky et al., supra note 75, at 23.
101. For an account of the strategies and activities of the Spanish banks in Latin
America, see Mauro F. Guillen & Adrian E. Tschoegl, At Least the International-
ization of Retail Banking? The Case of the Spanish Banks in Latin America
(Wharton School, Center for Financial Institutions, Working Paper No. 99-41,
1999).
102. See Foreign Financial Institutions in Latin America: 2001 Update, supra note 29.
103. See Crystal et al., supra note 28. See also Ramon Moreno & Agustin Villar, The
Increasing Role of Foreign Bank Entry in Emerging Markets, BIS Papers No 23
(May 9, 2005), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap23a.pdf.
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aiming at building up longer-term institutional strength. 1°4
The aggressive expansion of the foreign banks in the region elevated
the efficiency of the local banking system. It certainly is a positive out-
come. But as some scholars have pointed out, this has not translated into
greater macroeconomic effectiveness.10 5 It was expected that foreign
banks would help improve or mitigate bad credit conditions by enhancing
the existing supply, cost, and maturity conditions of financing. Even
though lending by domestic affiliates has increasingly displaced direct
dollar-denominated lending by the head of offices of international
banks,10 6 the supply of credit is still very low, as foreign banks are more
cautious than domestic banks when extending credit in the region, and
their response to crisis is pro-cyclical, intensifying with it the effects of
monetary tightening. In addition, the entry of foreign banks has not had
a meaningful effect on the cost of capital. Foreign banks seem to be
adopting a pragmatic approach, adapting to the features of the Latin
American banking markets that register large spreads in the process of
banking intermediation, rather than imposing their own dynamic on the
determination of capital costs.
The performance of foreign banks in Latin America has also been criti-
cized because their expertise and extra resources might allow them to
display cherry picking behavior as well as concentrate their lending on
large enterprises, instead of small and medium sized ones.10 7 The evi-
dence found by the IADB is still inconclusive regarding the effect of for-
eign bank presence on lending to small enterprises. 10 8 Furthermore,
Levy-Yeyati and Micco studied the evidence for eight Latin American
countries and found that foreign bank penetration appears to have led to
less competitive banking sectors.10 9
Cardenas, Graf, and O'Dogherty also found evidence that in cases
where foreign bank ownership is highly concentrated, decisions taken by
foreign banks can inflict economic damage to host economies.'10 They
refer to the effects of the decisions made by the head office of the Span-
ish bank Santander as a consequence, among other factors, of the regula-
tion applied by the home country authorities.' Its subsidiary Banco
Santa Cruz started restructuring its balance sheet with a really dramatic
reduction of credit. This policy was followed by other foreign subsidiar-
104. These observations are based on a study of the behavior of foreign banks in Latin
America during the period 1995-2000. See Crystal et al., supra note 28.
105. See Moguillansky et al., supra note 75.
106. See Moreno & Villar, supra note 103.
107. Id. at 13. Moreno and Villar justify this behaviour of foreign banks in Latin
America by arguing that it reflects the performance of "small foreign banks, which
may lack the resources to evaluate small borrowers."
108. See UNLOCKING, supra note 77.
109. See Levy-Yeyati & Micco, supra note 89.
110. See Juan Cirdenas et al., Foreign Banks Entry in Emerging Market Economies: A
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ies, and the overall effect was to worsen the conditions of the already
troubled Bolivian economy.
As Crystal, Dages, and Goldberg argue, "[t]he ownership changes in
Latin America remain relatively recent, and have taken place during a
period when local economic conditions have been difficult while home-
country conditions for foreign parent banks have been strong. '112 In this
sense, although the evidence supports the contribution of foreign banks
to sounder and more stable banking systems in the region, these results
are not enough to draw concluding statements on the behavior and conse-
quences of foreign banks acting in developing countries. 113
Furthermore, as stated by Moreno and Villar, "[t]he supervisory re-
sponse to the rapid rise of foreign banks is still being refined - and, in
some countries, remains an important task. '114 This is a core area, as
there is evidence that foreign banks transmit shocks from their home
countries. Changes in their claims on other countries where they also
operate extend to the individual financial system that hosts their activi-
ties.115 In this sense, the risk of systemic crises and contagion in the re-
gion is still very high. Following Moguillansky, Studart, and Vergara, the
behavior of banks acting multi-nationally
towards their subsidiaries and branches depends on a number of fac-
tors: the institutional framework in the corporation's country of origin;
the institutional framework in the host country; and steps taken by the
local authorities during the crises. In practice, the parent companies of
international banks cannot be considered lenders of last resort; their be-
haviour at times of crisis has depended on the nature of the problems the
banks were facing in the host country and the type of establishment in
question.116
Their findings suggest that foreign banks tend to adapt to the local sys-
tems more than local banks adopt international norms and standards that
suppose an unconditional support of the headquarters company as an in-
surance against systemic risk.
Finally, it is important to consider that local banks in the region do not
become multi-national banks as they usually do not have branches or sub-
sidiaries in other countries of the region or sub-region. According to the
IADB, financial integration in Latin America has occurred mostly in a de
facto fashion with developed countries, rather than with other countries
of the region.11 7 More than 98 percent of the foreign banks' share of
assets comes from developed country banks, and only 2 percent come
112. See Crystal et al., supra notes 28.
113. See James R. Barth et al., The Foreign Conquest of Latin American Banking:
What's Happening and Why? (Center for Research on Economic Development
and Policy Reform, Working Paper No. 171, 33 2003).
114. See Moreno & Villar, supra note 103, at 9.
115. See Maria Soledad Martinez Peria et al., Banking on Foreigners: The Behavior of
International Bank Lending to Latin America 1985-2000, 82 CEPAL REV. 19
(2004).
116. See Moguillansky et al., supra note 75, at 33.
117. See UNLOCKING, supra note 77.
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from banks within the region.118 The same is true for cross-listings and
other forms of financial integration. These cross-border operations are
not sophisticated or representative (except from the remittances from cit-
izens living abroad). The main reason is that capital is scarce and finan-
cial development is limited in the Latin American countries.
IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Due to the external debt crisis of the 1980s, economic policies based on
the so-called Washington Consensus"1 9 started to be implemented unilat-
erally and/or in conjunction with IFI conditionality 120 by various Latin
American countries during the mid to late 1980s and 1990s. Fiscal adjust-
ment, trade liberalization, financial deregulation, welcoming of foreign
investment, and the privatization of a substantial number of public enter-
prises were the focus of structural reforms. But such policies and their
implementation seemed to be insufficient in terms of economic growth,
development, and prevention of financial crises. As a result, many Latin
American citizens have come to view themselves to be poorer today than
in the 1980s. One of the main criticisms argues that the neo-liberal
polices ignored the potential role that changes in institutions and the legal
system could play in accelerating the economic and social development of
the region.' 2' Moreover, the region, in the past several years, has wit-
nessed the reappearance of left-wing populist politicians emphasizing the
explicit aim of counteracting economic neo-liberalism. 22
Eduardo Lora of the IADB developed a structural policies index
aimed at describing and measuring the advance of the structural reforms
in Latin America. 123 This index summarizes the progress of policies in
the trade, financial, tax, privatization, and labor areas. 124 Using the indi-
cator, he concluded that the reforms have made it possible to appreciably
raise the quality of policies, especially in the trade and finance areas, and
to a lesser extent, in privatization and in the tax and labor areas. 25 In a
recent paper, Lora and Panizza found that the overall index for structural
reforms, which combines the referred five areas of policies in seventeen
Latin American countries, had risen from 0.34 in 1984 to 0.58 (out of a
118. Id.
119. See Williamson, supra note 57.
120. Cf Ariel Buira, An Analysis of IMF Conditionality, Paper Presented for the XVI
Technical Group Meeting of the Intergovernmental Group of 24 Port of Spain,
Trinidad and Tobago (Feb.13-14, 2003).
121. See BURKI & PERRY, supra note 54.
122. Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Bolivia, with even Mexico possibly to
follow suit in 2006.
123. Eduardo Lora, A Decade of Structural Reforms in Latin America: What Has Been
Reformed and How to Measure It (IABD Office of the Chief Economist, Working
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maximum value of one by the late 1990s).126 To them, these results sug-
gest that many countries have a very broad margin of unexploited poten-
tial for the introduction of additional reforms.
The increasing partial opening of national boundaries through the de
jure multilateral agreements and various PTAs, and even more so by the
increasing presence of banks acting internationally or multi-nationally
consequent to the de facto financial integration originated by the unilat-
eral decisions of the involved nations and underpinned by soft law inter-
national standards, is integrating financial systems not only in the
Western Hemisphere but also globally. There already are or will be
global, hemispheric, regional, or sub-regional banking and financial mar-
kets but, still national laws, regulations, and institutions prevail. In this
sense, it will be of essential importance to focus on the need for strong
domestic, sub-regional, regional, and hemispheric institutions and to
make clear rules of the road to be able to viably support these markets
and to begin reconciling the differences among these integrationist cul-
tures and those of the countries involved. These institutions should adapt
to the significant unfolding changes and challenges, firmly stand up
against crude political interference, and give confidence to the providers
of financial services as well as to the investors and customers at domestic
and international levels.
A gradual and eventual convergence will need to join the following
divergent processes: the shallow integration originated by formal, hard
law, multilateral, and PTAs based on the removal of barriers to trade of
financial services and limited coordination of national policies, and the
deeper integration promoted by banks and financial institutions actually
acting internationally and multi-nationally, ruled by international stan-
dards and codes embodied in soft law and requiring coordination of do-
mestic policies. Such a convergence process also will need to bring
together different legal systems that protect differently the rights of credi-
tors and investors and that promote the development of financial systems
more or less efficiently. As a consequence, governments in the Latin
American region will need to work together towards harmonizing rules
applicable to domestic and foreign financial and banking services provid-
ers, with the aim of avoiding regulatory arbitrage. These governments
also will have to cope with linking efficient and inefficient judiciary sys-
tems, which may produce forum shopping and significantly impact the
flow of Foreign Direct Investment to the countries in the Hemisphere.
All these circumstances call for domestic and supranational strong
institutions.
To the end of achieving a constructive convergence process, a bottom-
up-building block strategy should still be considered the best option for
the Latin American countries. Under this approach, the first stage would
126. Eduardo Lora & Ugo Panizza, Structural Reforms in Latin America Under Scru-
tiny, Prepared for the Seminar Reforming Reforms, IADB, Research Department
(Mar. 11, 2002).
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focus on laying an appropriate foundation in the form of an effective in-
stitutional framework for the regulation and supervision of the financial
system in each country. This would require truly independent central
banks, regulators, and supervisors as well as adequately structured pri-
vate institutions and markets. Following this initial program, by no
means an insignificant accomplishment, the goal would then be to address
more substantively the issues of market access and potential sub-regional,
regional, and hemispheric harmonization and integration.127
At the same time, our thinking of legal educational is a core issue that
should be carefully addressed, moving beyond a century-old, traditional,
domestic approach and making legal education more global and inte-
grated and more of a life-long experience. Regulators, supervisors, ad-
ministrative judges, and potential arbitrators will need to be trained and
periodically updated in the knowledge of the different cultures addressed
in this article. But the specific reform priorities still will differ from coun-
try to country based on their own needs and capabilities.
127. See Norton, supra note 37, at 175-78.
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